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Abstract—The rise in embedded and IoT device usage comes with
an increase in LTE usage as well. About 70% of an estimated 18
billion IoT devices will be using cellular LTE networks for efficient
connections. This introduces several challenges such as security,
latency, scalability, and quality of service, for which reason Edge
Computing or Fog Computing has been introduced. The edge is
capable of offloading resources to the edge to reduce workload at
the cloud. Several security challenges come with Multi-access Edge
Computing (MEC) such as location-based attacks, the man in the
middle attacks, and sniffing. This paper proposes a Software-Defined
Perimeter (SDP) framework to supplement MEC and provide added
security. The SDP is capable of protecting the cloud from the edge
by only authorizing authenticated users at the edge to access services
in the cloud. The SDP is implemented within a Mobile Edge LTE
network. Delay analysis of the implementation is performed, followed
by a DoS attack to demonstrate the resilience of the proposed
SDP. Further analyses such as CPU usage and Port Scanning were
performed to verify the efficiency of the proposed SDP. This analysis
is followed by concluding remarks with insight into the future of the
SDP in MEC.
Index Terms—Edge Computing, MEC, SDP, Security, LTE, Fog
Computing, DoS
I. INTRODUCTION
THERE will be an estimated 18 billion IoT devices connectedto the internet by 2022, 70% of which will be on cellular LTE
networks ( a 5% share of LTE which is only expected to grow)
[1]. Unfortunately, IoT systems in comparison to conventional
computing systems have higher vulnerabilities and thus, more
inherent security challenges. If these security challenges are not
addressed properly, the wide adoption of IoT applications such
as smart healthcare, smart cities, smart grids, smart transportation
system, and smart agriculture cannot be realized [2]. For example,
in a smart healthcare system, it is of utmost importance to secure
sensitive information as well as critical assets in the system
[3]. All IoT devices share common characteristics (such as low-
cost design, high privacy requirement, high availability, and high
trust-related issues) that makes securing IoT devices difficult
with conventional security frameworks [4]. For example, it was
reported by Forbes.com that a successful attack that compromises
a baby monitor device occurred in Houston [5]. Another incident
was reported of a car been hijacked and stopped remotely by an
attacker while the driver was driving on a highway [6]. A survey
conducted by CNN Money reveals that attackers have found
vulnerability points of many IoT devices such as DVRs [7], smart
cameras [8], and smart plugs [9] used in smart home settings.
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These reports necessitate the need to design a reliable security
framework to secure IoT systems. Although the realization of
IoT systems will make life easier and more convenient, it comes
with several performance challenges such as security, latency,
scalability, and quality of service.
The concept of Edge computing has emerged as an innovative
architecture that can improve the performance of IoT networks
by acting as an intermediary to connect the edge devices to the
cloud. For instance, edge computing can help reduce the response
time and energy consumption of IoT networks. It can achieve this
due to the presence of intermediary devices reducing traffic to the
cloud servers.
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)
published the white paper on Multi-access Edge Computing
(MEC) in September 2014, authored by the founders of the
MEC industry initiative [10]. In this paper, they discuss the
applications and deployment scenarios for MEC. The pattern
for each scenario generally consists of an LTE base station or
evolved Node B base stations (eNB) through which all User
Equipment (UEs) connect to the LTE network. The traffic is
forwarded to the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) which consists
of the Mobility Management Entity (MME), Home Subscriber
Server (HSS), Serving Gateway (SGW), and Packet Data Network
Gateway (PGW) from which traffic is redirected to the cloud. This
pattern enables use cases such as activity device location tracking,
low latency/ high bandwidth content delivery, edge-based video
analytics, dynamic content optimization, and application-aware
performance optimization [10].
Despite the many advantages provided by adopting an edge
computing-based architecture to connect edge and cloud com-
puting (especially in terms of response time and energy con-
sumption), several challenges/concerns arise in such architectures.
Edge computing is an extension of the cloud and thus experiences
similar security and privacy concerns. For instance, the inherent
confidentiality issue worsened in the context of edge computing
due to several applications (e.g., location-awareness service for
mobile users) hosted at the edge of the network. This causes
vulnerability to location-based attacks on end-devices where the
user’s information can be easily intercepted [10,11]. Another
security concern is the integrity of different entities (such as
end-users, service providers, and infrastructure providers) in the
edge computing ecosystem. This opens up trust and authentication
issues between these entities that eventually will lead to attacks
such as sniffing and man-in-the-middle attacks [11,12]. End user’s
privacy (such as data and location) preservation is another critical
issue that arises in the edge computing paradigm due to proximity
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Fig. 1: Challenges
to end devices. Sensitive information such as credit card numbers,
personal emails, etc needs to be secured from attacks. Moreover,
location-based services like the global positioning system (GPS)
that require a user to share his/her location is another point of
vulnerability [11].
Edge computing requires a security framework to mitigate the
aforementioned challenges. One framework capable of doing so is
Software Defined Perimeter (SDP). The Cloud Security Alliance
(CSA) proposed the SDP framework for securing any networking
connected infrastructure. It does so by separating the data and
control planes in a controller-based authentication model [13].
Therefore, this paper proposes a combined MEC-SDP architecture
that aims to secure LTE traffic at the edge before it reaches
the cloud. The main contribution of this paper is summarized as
follows:
• Propose a novel MEC-SDP architecture model that secures
LTE traffic at the edge.
• Provide an End-to-End delay analysis of the proposed archi-
tecture.
• Verify the effectiveness of the proposed architecture against
DOS and port scanning attacks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II
discusses the security challenges and concerns facing the edge-to-
cloud computing connection, as well as some of the related work
proposed in the literature to tackle them. In section III, the SDP
framework as a potential solution is described in more detail in
terms of its concept, architecture, and possible implementations.
Moreover, the benefits gained by adopting it as a security frame-
work within a network are presented. In section IV, some of the
important attacks suffered in the mobile networking paradigm as
reported in the literature are discussed. In Section V, a combined
architecture is proposed and discussed in detail. In Section VI,
the MEC-SDP combined architecture is implemented and delay
analysis of the testbed is presented. In section VII, the discussion
of test results is presented. Lastly, in Section VIII, the paper is
concluded by reiterating the importance of the presented study
and discussing the potential for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Edge Computing Security
Edge computing is an emergent technology where cloud
computing-like capabilities are extended to the edge of the
network. This significantly reduces the latency experienced
in cloud computing framework and provides seamless inte-
gration with various application service providers and ven-
dors [14]. However, adopting such architecture introduces nu-
merous challenges/concerns. As shown in Fig. 1, these chal-
lenges/concerns can be divided into two main categories: security
challenges/concerns and privacy challenges/concerns. In what
follows, a brief description of each of these challenges is given
along with some of the related work done in the literature to
address them.
The security category comprises of wireless network security
challenges, authentication and trust challenges, access control, and
intrusion detection. Edge Computing takes advantage of several
different technologies to build the network introducing potential
to several attacks such as man-in-the-middle-attack, DoS attacks,
DDOS attack, and wireless jamming [12]. The use of virtualization
technology within the edge computing platform also introduces
potential security threats such as virtual machine (VM) hopping
or eavesdropping.
Several studies in the literature have focused on mitigating the
effect of some of the aforementioned challenges in the context of
edge computing. For example, the authors in [15] proposed a per-
packet based detection mechanism that integrates packet filtering
techniques with a congestion control framework to mitigate DDOS
attacks. Whenever a malicious packet is identified, it will be
dropped before reaching its target. Another study [16] proposed a
mechanism that exploits the fact that packets from the same path
have a similar identifier to detect DDOS attacks. By this analogy,
packets that have the same identifier as previously detected
DDOS-oriented packets are most likely to be a DDOS attack. In
[17], the authors proposed a negative selection algorithm that aims
to detect the legitimacy of a user based on a set of eigenvalues to
resist a DDOS attack. All the aforementioned mechanism requires
per-packet information such as packet identifier and IP/MAC
addresses to effectively detect DDOS attacks which an attacker
can manipulate. This clearly illustrates the necessity of adopting a
stronger solution that can prevent DOS and DDOS attacks without
relying on any packet information.
There is a significant amount of literature that demonstrates
the advantage of adopting machine learning and deep learning
techniques in detecting DDOS attacks [18]–[20]. In [18], the
authors utilize some basic machine learning techniques such as
Bayes and Bayesian network classifiers to successfully detect
botnet DDOS attacks. A deep learning model was adopted in [20]
to detect encrypted DDOS traffic using a simple auto-encoding
mechanism. Similarly, the authors in [16] use neural networks to
detect DDOS attacks. These learning-based detection approaches
require a significant amount of DDOS traffic for learning/training
purposes, which can only be acquired after the edge servers are
exposed to the attacks. Therefore, a better security framework is
much needed to fully adopt an edge computing platform.
Another security threat that sees a lot of research effort is
authentication and authorization between edge devices and edge
servers. The author in [21] proposed adopting an active jammer
with a wireless injection mechanism to mitigate the brute-force
attack that occurs while decrypting WPA traffic. In [22], a revised
version of the original key exchange process in WPA/WPA2
protocol is proposed to reduce the vulnerabilities in authentica-
tion schemes. A black-box verification approach is adopted in
[23] to tackle impersonation attacks that weaken authentication
3procedures.
From the aforementioned discussion, it is evident that a resilient
security framework that can mitigate various attacks simultane-
ously is needed. SDP is one such framework capable of meeting
a network’s security requirements.
Fig. 2: SDP Architecture
B. Software Defined Perimeter (SDP)
SDP is a zero-trust security framework, meaning it works on a
need to know authentication model for every service regardless of
where in the network you accessing it from [24]. This pattern
is versatile for many applications and as such, SDP has been
explored in several applications and thoroughly tested. It has
recently been proposed as a security framework for both Network
Function Virtualization and Software Defined Networking. Both
suffer from challenges such as hypervisor hijacking, DoS attack
vulnerability, Virtual Machine hopping, and backdoor attacks.
With the introduction of SDP, security threats were successfully
mitigated without sacrificing performance [25,26]. SDP has also
been explored for IoT purposes; the traditional authentication
methods used in Message Queuing Telemetry Transport is re-
placed with SDP’s single packet authorization mechanism. This
study demonstrated SDP’s capability to introduce security and
privacy to vulnerable and low bandwidth IoT networks [27].
This paper differs from previous studies in that it explores the
advantage of introducing SDP to MEC. The SDP components
are split amongst the edge and the cloud in this architecture and
combined with the LTE core network for the first time.
III. SOFTWARE DEFINED PERIMETER FRAMEWORK
A. SDP Overview
Due to the ever-increasing network security challenges brought
by the rapid development of today’s networking paradigm (espe-
cially the ’software-ization’ of network resources), the traditional
security model that aims to secure network resources within a
defense perimeter can no longer suffice network security needs.
Hence, many organizations have proposed security specifications
for a robust software-based security framework that meet the
current network security needs.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
defined a zero-trust architecture (ZTA) to plan an enterprise’s
infrastructure and workflows that follow a zero trust model as the
basis for its architecture [28]. SDP, another security framework
that adopts the zero trust model was proposed by the CSA. Table
1 presents a comparative analysis of the two frameworks in terms
of access authorization responsibility, framework components, and
practical implementation. Considering the promising results in
mitigating numerous attacks obtained by adopting SDP [13,25,26],
and the open source implementation of SDP components by
Waverley Labs, we chose to adopt SDP in this work.
Typically, the SDP framework consists of three actors; SDP
controller, SDP initiating host (IH), and SDP accepting host (AH).
Using a variety of combinations of these components, SDP can
be implemented to suit multiple frameworks such as client-to-
gateway, client-to-server, server-to-server, and client-to-server-to-
client [29]. For the purposes of this work, we adopt the client-
to-gateway architecture as shown in Figure 2 because it provides
seamless integration with the proposed architecture. Under this
framework, the service(s) is/are protected behind the AH module
such that the AH module acts as a gateway between the clients and
the protected service(s). Similar to Software-Defined networking,
SDP decouples the control plane and the data plane. The SDP
controller resides in the control plane and serves as the brain that
makes the final decision on the legitimacy of any client before
granting access to any service. Figure 4 displays a conceptual
architecture for SDP workflow.
When an SDP controller is brought online, it connects to
the appropriate authentication and authorization services such
as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) issuing certificate authority
services, OpenID, SAML, OAuth, LDA, etc. All hosts (i.e., either
initiating or accepting) in the SDP network must authenticate to
the controller by sending an SPA packet as shown in Figure 4. For
interested readers regarding the details of packets’ format (i.e.,
SPA packet, Login request, Login response, connection request
and connection response) depicted in Figure 4, refer to [30]. The
SDP controller keeps a list of authorized hosts and services in
a MySQL database and generates keys and certificates for each
host in the database. After a client is successfully authenticated,
the controller sends an IH services message containing a list of
available AHs and services to the client. Then the SDP controller
sends a message to the gateway to configure its firewall rules to
allow the client’s request to pass and access a service through
the AH services message and IH authenticated message. After
that, the gateway establishes a Mutual Transport Layer Security
(mTLS) connection between the client and itself for a defined
period for data transfer. It is worth mentioning that when this
defined period ends, the rule to accept the client’s request will be
deleted but the connection is left open and monitor by the tracking
mechanism within the AH module.
B. SDP Security Benefits
Any security framework must guarantee a certain level of
certainty in terms of resource protection, data integrity, access
control, availability issues, and confidentiality related issues. As
a matter of fact, the SDP framework combines five layers of
security to tackle these uncertainties. These security layers are
single packet authentication (SPA), mutual transport layer security
(mTLS), device validation (VD), dynamic firewall, and application
binding (AppB) [13]. The SPA packet is the first message sent
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Fig. 4: Conceptual Architecture for SDP Workflow
to initiate connection paths either between the controller and
accepting host or initiating host and accepting host. Then a secure
mTLS connection is established only when the SPA packet is valid
and verified by the controller. Despite having been authenticated,
the device validation process is used to validate the integrity of
users to ensure the credential keys are not stolen by a third party
intruder. A dynamic firewall policy ensures all traffic is blocked at
all times except when authorized by the controller and application
binding process forces users to only communicate through the
secure mTLS connection. The combination of these five protocols
provides a strong security framework capable of mitigating many
network-based attacks such as DOS attack, MITM attack, port
scanning attack, and so on.
Looking at confidentiality related issues such as leakage of
sensitive private information or credential keys, the SDP frame-
work not only provides a secure mTLS connection to ensure no
data is retrieved by the unauthorized users but also has a device
validation process to track the legitimacy of users throughout the
user’s session.
In the context of security, the availability of components that
make up the security framework is of utmost importance to
ensure always-on protection of network resources. Failure of any
5TABLE I: Software defined perimeter versus zero trust architecture
Features Software defined perimeter (SDP) Zero trust architecture (ZTA)
Main purpose
Securing defined network resources from illegiti-
mate clients using a dynamic firewall mechanism
with drop-all policy for incoming traffic [30].
Securing enterprise resources from unauthorized
users through authentication and authorization pro-
cedures to reduce the implicit trust zones within the
enterprise’s network [28].
Adopted
Model
A zero trust security model (i.e., no client is trusted
even if it resides within the network) [24] A zero trust security model [28]
Components
• SDP controller: This component is responsible
for creating credential keys and authentication
of clients.[30]
• SDP accepting host: This component is respon-
sible for blocking all unauthorized traffic and
works closely with the controller to enforce
these rules.[30]
• SDP initiating host: This component is the le-
gitimate client stored in the controller database
and given a credential keys for authentica-
tion.[30]
• Policy Engine (PE): This component is the
main brain responsible for final decision to
grant legitimate users access to any network
resource. [28]
• Policy Administrator: This component works
closely with the PE to create credential keys
and authentication tokens that will be use to
grant access to legitimate users. Moreover,
it is responsible for establishing connection
path between legitimate users and authorized
resource. [28]
• Policy Enforcement Point: The responsibility
of PEP is to enable, monitor and eventually
terminate connection path between legitimate
users and authorized resources. [28]
Access autho-
rization
The SDP controller makes the decision to grant
or deny access to network resources using the
generated credential to authenticate and verify client
requests [24,30].
The PE uses the enterprise defined policies and a
set of external information (such as ID management
system, enterprises’ public key infrastructure (PKI),
data access policies, threat intelligence feeds and
continuous diagnostic and mitigation systems) as an
input to a trust algorithm to grant or deny access to
network resources. [28]
Implementations Waverly Labs OpenSDP Project NA
components might give attackers a window to breach the network.
Due to the ’software-ized’ nature of SDP framework, the controller
and gateway are readily available as software installed within the
network. The effect of software crashes is minimal as the time
re-instantiate the SDP components is short [25].
IV. ATTACKS IN MOBILE NETWORKING
Mobile networking suffers from several potential attack vec-
tors introduced by a shift towards an IP-based architecture and
new radio access technologies. These attacks can compromise
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of mobile networks [31].
In [31], several attack types are explored including security and
confidentiality attacks, IP based attacks, signaling attacks, and
jamming attacks. The attack targets for these include DoS, Voice
over LTE (VoLTE), General Packet Radio Service Tunneling Pro-
tocol (GTP), physical layer, and LTE security. Attacks on VoLTE
include message forgery, flooding, and message tampering which
may result in VoLTE degradation, over-billing, voice phishing, and
even DoS [32]. GTP can be taken advantage of to compromise
information, exhaust network resources, perform phishing, and
interrupt services [33]. Denial of service attacks can occur in
a variety of ways including flooding, redirection, interference,
and spoofing. It is an example of an attack target which falls
under each of the aforementioned attack types. The attacks such
as VoLTE and GTP are highly specific to just specific features
of LTE. Voice over LTE is an optional feature offered by LTE
networks to place voice calls over LTE. GTP utilized SIP-based
messaging that has security risks which can be mitigated by strong
SIP message checking. DOS attacks on the contrary are highly
generic and can result in Loss of Confidentiality, Availability,
Integrity, Control or even Theft of service.
The choice of network-based attack for this paper is the DoS
attack. According to Nexusguard, the year on year increase of
this type of attack is up 85.66% in 2019 Q3 [34]. There are
several types of DoS attacks such as low-rate DoS which use
short period bursts of traffic to keep the router buffer full [35]
[36], HTTP flood attack which sends an influx of valid GET
requests to an HTTP server incapacitating it [37], or TCP SYN
Flood attacks which used spoofed IPs to take advantage of the
TCP three-way handshake [38]. The attack in this paper is a
6TCP SYN Flood attack which has seen a 177.37% year-on-year
growth. This attack, as previously discussed, targets vulnerabilities
in the widely adopted three-way handshake which makes is such
a versatile threat.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The combined MEC-SDP architecture in this paper is being
proposed for the first time. MEC allows for reduced energy
consumption, improved response times, and introduces several
new use cases but comes with some security disadvantages as
mentioned prior. SDP provides an added layer of security by
separating the control and data planes and using SPA based
authentication, enabling us to secure LTE traffic to the cloud at
the Edge.
The proposed architecture, depicted in Figure 3 consists of a
Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) based eNB setup.
The USRP can transmit and receive an LTE signal as well as
connect to a host machine running the eNB over a high-speed
link. LTE devices with configured SIM cards can connect to
the USRP and as a result, be connected to the EPC. The EPC
consists of HSS, MME, SGW, and PGW. The HSS maintains
user subscription information for UEs. The MME handles the
control plane by interacting with the HSS. The SGW and PGW are
the inbound and outbound gateways, respectively. The SGW acts
as a router between the eNB and the PGW and the PGW uses
the SGi interface to communicate with the edge gateway. This
ultimately provides the UEs with a route to the public internet via
the gateway. An SDP controller and gateway are situated on their
own Linux 16.04 machines which are used to secure the cloud
services from UEs at the edge. A VM in the cloud is incorporated
to allow us to connect to the ssh service. The user keys and
certificates are generated by the controller and distributed, for the
purposes of this paper that distribution is a manual process.
UEs are configured with the SDP client and connected to the
USRP and eNB using Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) LTE
dongles. The eNB forwards traffic to the EPC, which then for-
wards all traffic to the SDP gateway machine. To access the service
which has been deployed in the cloud, the UE must authenticate
with the controller at the edge first. Without authenticating with
SDP, no internet access is granted at all. The end to end interaction
with the system is depicted in Figure 6. Algorithm 1 provides
a detailed authentication process for the proposed MEC-SDP
architecture. When a UE with a SIM configured for the LTE
network joins the network, it establishes a connection via the
USRP and eNB. The eNB relays this to the EPC, in which the
HSS updates to account for the new UE and allows the UE to
access the internet. In order for the UE to access the service in
the cloud, however, it must be authorized using SDP. The UE
client sends the initial SPA message to the gateway at the edge
which communicates to the controller. If authorized, all connected
gateways update their firewall via FWKNOP to allow only the
access level specified by the SDP controller. The UE should now
be able to connect to via the gateway to the services they have
been authorized to, which is only the service.
This edge controller approach offloads the control plane to the
edge of the network, improving response times for authentication
to the SDP network. SDP can also be used to secure edge services
that prevent unauthorized access to services such as location
monitoring, mitigating the potential for location-based attacks.
Also, by moving the controller to the edge with its gateway,
the controller is protected from targeted attacks from unsecured
networks as well.
VI. TEST-BED AND DELAY ANALYSIS
The testbed used in this paper consists of two open-source tools.
For the LTE Core and Radio Access Network, OpenAirInterface
(OAI) open-source project and for the SDP network, Waverley
Labs’ Open SDP project. The system is comprised of 6 physical
machines and an AWS EC2 instance. Figure 5 displays the
actual machines emulating the complete LTE network and those
emulating the SDP environment. Descriptions of each component
in the testbed is provided in Table 2.
Algorithm 1: UE client authentication process for the pro-
posed MEC-SDP framework
The LTE network is brought online;
Assume the edge GTWY (AH) is already initialized and
authorized by the edge CTRL;
The UE client sends an SPA packet to the edge controller;
if the SPA packet is valid then
The edge CTRL verifies the UE client (using the stored
certificate) and establishes an mTLS secure connection
between itself and the UE client;
The edge CTRL sends all information about the UE
client’s authorized service (s) to the edge GTWY;
The UE client sends SPA packet to the edge GTWY;
if the SPA packet is valid then
The edge GTWY verifies the UE client using the
certificate provided by the edge CTRL;
The edge GTWY sets up corresponding firewall rules
to allow UE client access to the authorized service
(s) for a defined period, T;
if T > 0 then
The UE client attempt to ssh into the AWS
instance protected by the edge GTWY;
while connection tracking is still valid do
Send test packets;
else
The edge GTWY removes corresponding firewall
rules
else
Block all connection request from the UE client;
else
Drop all packets
A. Test Case
Firstly, the LTE network is brought online starting with the EPC
module, then the eNodeB module, and finally the UE. For the
EPC module, the four entities are launched sequentially starting
with the HSS entity then the MME entity followed by the SPGW-
U entity and finally the SPGW-C entity. After the EPC module
stabilizes, the eNodeB is brought online which automatically
connects to the MME entity. Lastly, the UE is brought online and
is automatically attached and connected to the EPC via eNodeB.
Then the connection is established on the authorized client UE.
To do this, the LTE network is joined and then the SDP client
software is run. This will send an SPA packet to the SDP gateway
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Fig. 5: Testbed Setup
to authenticate. The gateway verifies with the controller and will
update its firewall accordingly to allow communication from the
client if it has permissions. The client can now SSH to the cloud
service using the NAT gateway. The configuration is such that
an SSH session on port 4444 of the gateway will redirect and
consequently establish an SSH session with the service in the
cloud. The attacker machine also established a connection to the
same LTE network but does not authenticate to the controller
before attempting to flood the cloud service.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed framework, the
theoretical delay is compared with the actual delay incurred in
the implemented testbed. This delay analysis includes the end-to-
end delay (i.e., the time taken by a UE client to connect to the
ssh service on the cloud) with and without SDP, the controller
connection overhead, and the gateway connection overhead. The
gateway connection is then monitored for 120s, during which a
SYN flood attack is launched for 60 seconds. The traffic is all
captured at the SDP gateway and then analyzed. This is finally
followed by a port scan attack to verify the gateway configuration.
B. Delay Analysis
Any packet traversing through a computer network is sub-
jected to various types of delay along the path from source to
the destination node. The most important among these delays
are transmission delay, propagation delay, processing delay and
queuing delay. In this work, we assume the processing, and
UE / SDP 
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Fig. 6: Sequence Diagram
8TABLE II: Description of the Testbed
Machines Description
UE + Client
To emulate the legitimate UE, an LTE dongle (Huawei LTE USB stick, E3372) using an an
open-cells programmable USIM card is configured for our LTE network. This LTE dongle is then
connected to a Linux machine (Ubuntu 16.04) that has SDP client module offered by Waverley
Labs. This setup allows us to connect to the USPR device emulating eNodeB and also connects
to the SDP network as a legitimate user
USRP + eNodeB mod-
ule
The USRP is the National Instruments (NI) USRP-2901 model which is connected to a Linux
machine (ubuntu 18.04) running the OpenAirInterface5g eNodeB configuration over high speed
link
EPC module The EPC module is running on Linux machine (Ubuntu 18.04). We adopt the latest developedversion of the OpenAirInterface EPC module for this work
UE + Attacker
To emulate the illegitimate UE acting as the attacking entity sending a large volume of requests to
our service as well as performing port scanning attack, an LTE dongle (Huawei LTE USB stick,
E3372) using an an open-cells programmable USIM card is configured to our LTE network. This
LTE dongle is then connected to a Linux machine (Ubuntu 16.04) which allows us to connect to
the USPR device emulating eNodeB. The attack is performed using the HPING3 testing suite
SDP Controller
The SDP controller provided with the control module is running on a Linux machine (ubuntu
16.04). All UEs must authenticate with the SDP controller before gaining access to the service on
the cloud
SDP Gateway The SDP gateway is running on Linux machine (Ubuntu 16.04). It is configured with a drop-allpolicy for all traffic except from the controller
AWS Cloud Instance In AWS, there is an EC2 instance running Linux Ubuntu 16.04. The VM is used for a basic SSHservice which the gateway is protecting from unauthorized UEs
queuing delay is negligible relative to the other two delays. Thus
the total delay from one node to the next is the summation of
the transmission and propagation delay. This can be represented
mathematically as follows:
Total Delay =
α
R
+
β
S
(1)
Where α denotes the size of the packet, R denotes the trans-
mission rate of the link joining the two nodes under analysis,
β denotes the distance between the two nodes and S is the
propagation speed of the link. The proposed testbed has 4 nodes
as shown in Figure 7.
Fig. 7: Nodal representation
• Case 1: Delay in the Initialization phase
The delay incurred in the initialization phase involves the
time it takes to initiates the SDP and the LTE network. In
particular, we consider the overhead introduced for verification
and authentication process by the SDP controller and the gateway
as well as the connection setup time to the LTE network. Figure 8
shows the exchange of packets that occurs between the client and
the controller for verification and authentication purposes. The
gateway relays all the packets sent by the client to the controller
and vice versa. Thus, the overall SDP overhead is calculated as
follows:
SDP overhead = 3[
α1
R
+
β1
S
] + 4[
α2
R
+
β2
S
]
+ 3[
α3
R
+
β3
S
] + 5[
α4
R
+
β4
S
] (2)
Where α1 and β1 denote the size of the packet sent from the
UE Client to the gateway and the length of the link joining them
respectively. Likewise α2 and β2 denote the size of the packet
sent from the gateway to the controller and the length of the link
joining them respectively. α3 and β3 denote the size of the packet
sent from the controller to the gateway and the length of the link
joining them respectively and lastly α4 and β4 denote the size of
the packet sent from the the gateway back to the UE Client and
the length of the link joining them respectively.
Fig. 8: Controller and gateway overhead
For the LTE network, we consider the delay suffered for
connecting the UE to the eNB and the EPC module and is
9calculated as follows:
LTE Delay =
α5
R
+
β5
S
+
α6
R
+
β6
S
(3)
Where α5 and β5 denote the size of the packet sent from the
UE Client to the eNB and the length of the link joining them
respectively and α6 and β6 denote the size of the packet sent from
the eNB to the HSS module and the length of the link joining them
respectively.
Therefore the delay suffered in the initialization phase of the
proposed testbed is calculated as follows:
Delay = [
1
R
+
1
S
][3α1 + 4α2 + 3α3 + 5α4 + α5 + α6
+ 3β1 + 4β2 + 3β3 + 5β4 + β5 + β6] (4)
• Case 2: End-to-End Delay of the proposed testbed
The End-to-End delay of this work comprises of the initial-
ization phase delay and the delay suffered to ssh into the AWS
service as described in the previous section. It’s worth mentioning
that the controller overhead occurs only once for any legitimate
client. After a client is successfully registered and verified by the
controller, the only overhead in any other session is the gateway
overhead for updating the necessary firewall rules to allow access
to authorized service. Consequently the End-to-End delay with
SDP is calculated as follows:
End−to−End Delay = [ 1
R
+
1
S
][3α1+4α2+3α3+5α4+α5
+ α6 + α7 + α8 + 3β1 + 4β2 + 3β3
+ 5β4 + β5 + β6 + β7 + β8] (5)
Where α7 and β7 denote the size of the packet sent from the
UE Client to the cloud service and the length of the link joining
them respectively and α8 and β8 denote the size of the packet
sent from the cloud service to the UE client and the length of the
link joining them respectively.
VII. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As expected the end-to-delay with SDP is a bit higher than
without SDP as shown in Table 3. This is because the UE
client not only needs to authenticate with the SDP controller but
has to wait for the gateway to update the firewalls before the
service can be accessed. Next, the controller overhead as well as
the gateway overhead is determined by analyzing the exchange
of packets between the UE, gateway and the controller using
Wireshark tool. The process was monitored 10 times and the
average is recorded as 0.0477037 seconds and 0.04892312 seconds
respectively as depicted in Table 3. This overhead is very much
tolerable compared to the security benefits gained by adopting
SDP framework. Additionally, the calculated theoretical values
in the End-to-End delay with and without SDP were very much
closed to the actual measured values from the implemented testbed
which verifies the testbed correctness.
The DOS attack trails were performed 3 times for 2 minutes
each trail and the average of the captures is shown in Figure 9. The
blue curve is the measure of traffic with an ACK flag, which is
1-to-1 relation with packet volume being sent between the service
TABLE III: Delay Analysis Evaluation
Delays (sec) Theoretical Measured
End-to-End delay
with SDP 0.397653420 0.555149629
End-to-End delay
without SDP 0.278936738 0.547851958
Controller overhead NA 0.04477037
Gateway overhead NA 0.04892312
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Fig. 9: DOS attack capture
and the authorized client. The orange curve is a measure of attack
packets, which can be distinguished by the frame length of fewer
than 60 bytes, as DoS attacks attempt to send a high volume
of very small-sized packets. None of the attack packets were
acknowledged as they are dropped by the gateway. The graph
also shows that performance did not suffer during the duration of
the attack.
A port scan attack was also performed to verify the gateway
configuration, shown in Figure ??. For this purpose, we utilized
the free nmap utility tool to perform the attack with and without
SDP protection as displayed in Figure 10 and Figure 11 respec-
tively. The SDP client successfully uses port 5000 to authenticate
to the controller and port 4444 to access the service after au-
thentication, however, the port scan which was performed by the
attack UE shows ports 0-5500 as being closed when SDP is up.
This verifies the behavior of the gateway to block all traffic unless
from authenticated sources. However, when the same attack was
launched without SDP, the results show the TCP ssh connection as
open and available. This further confirms the effectiveness of SDP
framework in blackening the network from unauthorized users.
A CPU usage analysis is also performed and the results of
which are shown in Figure 12. The figure shows the load variation
under an attack with and without SDP at the gateway and the
client. The attack is launched at 30s, shortly thereafter CPU usage
increases. Without SDP, CPU usage at the gateway hits and even
exceeds 100%. On the contrary, with SDP enabled, the CPU usage
increases slowly until it reaches 40% and then reduces thereafter.
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Fig. 10: Port Scan Attack Without SDP
Fig. 11: Port Scan Attack With SDP
For the UE client, the CPU usage only accounts for the processing
power needed to run the UE and the SDP initiating host module on
the physical machine emulating the UE. Thus, the Client’s CPU
usage is uncorrelated with the attack as displayed by the green
and yellow curves in Figure 12.
Fig. 12: CPU Usage under DOS Attack
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper demonstrated the implementation of a combined
MEC-SDP combined architecture for the LTE Core network. The
security threats prevalent in MEC for LTE were discussed. The
framework which was proposed to mitigate these threats was
SDP. The architecture was described in detail followed by the
implementation and testing. The results were then evaluated. The
proposed SDP was capable of protecting cloud resources at the
edge. SDP was able to drop the attack and showed a reduced
CPU load compared to the unsecured case. A port scanning attack
was also performed to verify the ’darkening’ of services under the
SDP framework. The attacker was not aware of ports and services,
and should they be aware, will not have access to them without
presenting a valid SPA message.
This study and its results open new challenges for future work.
Firstly, the architecture explored only an edge gateway model,
however, for additional security, a cloud gateway for each service
can be introduced. In this way, services are only accessible by
UEs apart of the LTE network that can interface with the edge
controller. Secondly, edge services such as the aforementioned
edge location services can be secured via SDP. This maintains a
true zero trust architecture design as no location in the network
is considered trusted.
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